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JURISDICTION OF THE COURfr OF APPEALS 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
matter pursuant to the provisions of litah Code Ann. Section 78-
2a-3(g) (1987) and Rule 4(a) of the R|ules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals. 
NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
On October 14, 1986, the defendant filed a Motion for Order 
modifying the parties' divorce decree %o permit her to move from 
the State of Utah with the parties minor children. On December 
23, 1987, the plaintiff filed a Motiom for Immediate Change of 
Custody [of the parties' minor children] and Determination of 
Contempt against defendant. A trial on both Motions was held on 
February 10, 1987. This is an appeal from the decision denying 
plaintiff's motion and granting defendant' s, rendered by the 
Third Judicial District Court for Sailt Lake County, State of 
Utah, the Honorable Michael R. Murphy presiding, as announced, 
after trial, in open court on February 26, 1987, and formalized 
by Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order entered July 
23, 1987. Copies of said Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
and Order are attached hereto as Addendum Exhibit "A". 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. Did the trial court err by disregarding the parties' 
stipulation and permitting the defendant to move from the State 
of Utah to reside in the State of Washington with the parties' 
minor children without a determination that the move was not in 
the children' s best interest and in the face of overwhelming 
evidence that the move was not in the children' s interest. 
2. Did the trial court err in awarding defendant custody 
of the parties' minor children when the custody evaluator who 
recommended that defendant retain custody admitted that his 
opinion was rendered without the benefit of recent psychological 
evaluations that he considered important to such a degree that he 
might change his mind on the issue of custody if the evaluations 
merited such a change? 
3. Did the trial court err by refusing to find the 
defendant in contempt in the face of uncontested evidence that 
she knowingly violated a court order prohibiting her from moving 
from the state with the parties' children without court approval? 
STATEMENT PF THE CAgE 
On May 20, 1985 plaintiff filed a Complaint for 
dissolution of the parties' marriage. (R. 2) In that 
Complaint plaintiff sought custody of the parties' minor 
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children, Nathan and Melanie. (R 3) The matter was scheduled 
for trial on May 22, 1986. Prior to the date set for trial, a 
custody evaluation was conducted by Kim Peterson (R. 38; Ex. 
3-P) and psychological evaluations of the parties were 
performed by Dr. Barbara Liebroder. (Ex. 4-P) Mr. Peterson 
and Dr. Liebroder concluded that both parties were fit and 
proper parents to be awarded custody and control of their 
children (Ex. 3-P at p. 8; Ex. 4+-P at p. 1, R. 100) Kim 
Peterson recommended that custody be awarded to defendant, but 
emphasized that "the children's relationship with their father 
is felt to be very important and should not be interrupted. 
[Plaintiff] has a lot to offer the children and his interest 
in the children needs to be utilised. " (Ex. 3-P at p. 8) 
Dr. Liebroder conditioned her Recommendation that the 
defendant be awarded custody by noting that "Ms. Myers should 
continue to reside in Utah so that Mir. Myers can have frequent 
visitation to their children." (Ex. 4-P at p. 1) On the 
date set for trial, the parties entered into a Stipulation, 
which was incorporated into the coi^ rt' s Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Decree 0f Divorce. (R. 99-118) 
Paragraph 5 of the Findings of Fa^t and Conclusions of Law 
provides that: 
The parties stipulated that care, custody and 
control of the minor children ^f the parties should 
be awarded to the defendant provided that she remain 
in and reside with the children! in Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, or within 50 miles of Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah and thati she should not move 
from that area without either the permission of the 
plaintiff or the court, obtained by petitioning the 
court for permission to leave the area and 
establishing that such move would be in the best 
interest of the children after evaluation by follow-
up evaluation to be performed by Kim Peterson, the 
evaluator who performed the custody evaluation 
preceding this divorce. 
(R. 100-101 and 111). The Decree of Divorce was entered on 
June 10, 1986. 
Four months later, on October 14, 1986, the defendant 
filed a Motion for an Order permitting her to move from Utah 
with the children. (R. 138) The matter was initially set 
for hearing in October, 1986, but was continued to allow 
follow-up custody evaluations to be performed. (R. 134, 136, 
142; Tr. 3-5) 
In mid-December, 1986, the defendant took the children 
and left Utah without obtaining permission from either the 
court or the plaintiff. (R. 147-152; Tr. 150-151, 153-154, 
176-177, 181, 184-185, 191). In fact, in December of 1986 
when defendant met with Barbara Liebroder, the psychologist 
performing evaluations to assist the court in determining 
whether defendant should be allowed to remove the children 
from Utah, she gave no indication that she intended to leave 
without court approval. (Tr. p. 43) Defendant's husband 
indicated to Dr. Liebroder that, if the court denied defendant 
permission to move the children, he and the defendant would 
move and leave the children in Utah (Tr. p. 43). 
Nevertheless, without even permitting the children to say 
goodbye to the plaintiff, the defendant moved with the 
parties' children to Washington. (Tr. pp. 118-119) That 
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action was taken, in part, because defendant' s husband 
realized that, if they left the children in Utah, as per the 
court order, they would have less chance in prevailing in 
their Motion for permission to move Erom Utah. (Tr. 192) As a 
result of the defendant' s actions, p|laintiff was unable to see 
his children during the Christmas holidays. 
In response to the defendant' s move, on December 23, 
1986 plaintiff filed a Motion for Immediate Change of Custody 
and Determination of Contempt. (R. 153) Plaintiff's Motion 
was heard on January 5, 1987, the Honorable Michael Murphy, 
Judge, presiding. Judge Murphy determined that the matter 
should be reserved for trial. (R. 159-162) Plaintiff 
expressed concern that his position would be adversely 
impacted by the fact that the children had already been moved 
to Washington. The court responded to that concern by holding 
that the issues would be resolved 4s if the children had not 
been moved. (R. 161) The court further ordered that, pending 
trial, evaluations of the parties arid their children should be 
conducted by Dr. Liebroder and Kim Peterson. (R. 160-161) 
Trial on plaintiff s Motion was held on February 10, 
1987. Dr. Liebroder and Kim Petersen testified at the trial, 
and their follow-up reports were received into evidence. 
(Exhibits 1-P and 2-P) 
Dr. Liebroder' s report recommended that custody of 
the children be awarded to plaintiff (Tr. 23-24). The 
Doctor's recommendation was bas$d upon several factors 
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including: (1) a finding that defendant's priorities had 
shifted - placing a higher priority on her new marriage and 
her unborn child than she placed on the best interests of the 
parties' children (Tr. 32-33); and (2) results of a battery of 
psychological tests performed on the parties, defendant' s new 
husband and the children (Tr. 32, 38), which indicated that, 
since the divorce, plaintiff had made significant gains in his 
ability to handle stress while defendant' s stability had 
deteriorated. (Tr. 25, 43-46) 
Kim Peterson' s report states: 
Although I'm quite unhappy with the way [defendant] left 
the state against the court order, not even allowing the 
children and [Plaintiff] to say goodbye, I would see 
placement with the mother as being slightly more 
desirable as this approach would seem less disruptive. 
(Ex. 1-P at p. 8) Mr. Peterson noted that the ideal situation 
would be for plaintiff to continue to reside in Utah so that 
the children would have continued access to plaintiff (Exhibit 
1-P at p. 7; Tr. 139-140). Mr. Peterson testified that, 
although he had reviewed the results of psychological tests 
performed on the parties prior to their divorce, he had not 
reviewed the results of Dr. Liebroder' s most recent tests. 
(Tr. 143-144). Mr. Peterson noted that he had confidence in 
Dr. Liebroder's abilities (Tr. 105) and that his opinion of 
the custody issue might be impacted if he discovered that Dr. 
Liebroder concluded that plaintiff should be granted custody. 
(Tr. 116) 
After trial the court issued Findings of Fact. The 
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plaintiff considers the following findings central to the 
instant appeal: 
4. Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Leave the 
State of Utah based on defendant' s husband' s employment, but 
when the hearing of said motion was continued, defendant 
removed herself and the minor children to the State of 
Washington without the court' s permission and in knowing 
violation of the Order of this court. (R. 173) 
5. As a further change and circumstance, the plaintiff 
has undergone therapy in an effort to improve the emotional 
problems he was advised existed when the original custody 
evaluations were performed. (R. 173) 
6. Defendant' s stability has degenerated since the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, a large part of which 
degeneration has been caused by po&t-divorce problems. (R. 
174) 
7. Dr. Barbara Liebroder has conducted psychological and 
custodial evaluations on the parties, their children, the 
husband of the defendant and the girlfriend of plaintiff, and 
concluded that it would be in the best interests of the 
parties' minor children for the plaintiff to be awarded the 
care, custody and control of said minor children even though 
the minor children are bonded to the defendant, the defendant 
has been the primary caretaker of said children and can spend 
more time with said children. (R. 174). 
8. Kim Peterson, MSW, LCSW, recommended that it would 
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be in the best interests of the parties' minor children for 
the defendant to retain custody of the said minor children 
based upon the findings of the plaintiff s prior conduct and 
psychological problems contained in previous psychological 
reports, and based upon the plaintiff s being a full-time 
caretaker, having bonded with said children, and to avoid 
unnecessary trauma to the children of a change of custodial 
parent. He also recommended that the first choice of action 
in the best interest of the children would be that they remain 
in Salt Lake City, Utah with the defendant as their custodial 
parent. If that was not the order of the court, then it was 
slightly better that they remain in the custody of the 
defendant and reside in Washington than if custody was 
transferred to plaintiff. (R. 174) 
9. The court find (sic) that both parents are fit and 
proper persons to be awarded custody of said minor children. 
(R. 175). 
10. The court finds that it is in the best interest of 
the parties' minor children to remain in the custody of the 
defendant who is a full-time caretaker and who has bonded with 
said children, and that it would not be in the best interest 
of said children to change custody. (R. 175) 
11. Plaintiffs motion to hold defendant in contempt of 
court should be denied. (R. 178) 
Pursuant to those Findings of Fact the court concluded, 
as a matter of law, that: 
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1. The parties' minor children shall remain in the 
custody of the defendant subject to plaintiff's right to 
visitation, (R. 179); and 
2. Plaintiff s motion to hold the defendant in contempt 
is denied. (R. 182) 
Those conclusions were incorporated into the court' s 
Order. (R. 185 and 188) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
POINT I 
As part of the parties' divorce settlement, the defendant 
agreed that she would reside in the State of Utah with the 
parties' minor children unless the [plaintiff agreed to allow 
her to move with the children or there was a judicial 
determination that the move was in the children' s best 
interest. The defendant breached her agreement and moved the 
children to Washington without a determination that the move 
was in the best interest of the children. Absent compelling 
circumstances indicating that a modification of the parties' 
agreement was necessary, the trial court was bound to uphold 
the terms of the parties agreement. Furthermore, even absent 
an agreement, Utah law requires a trial court to determine 
that a move is in the best interest of the children before 
awarding custody of children to a parent who has moved. Thus, 
the trial court erred in awarding defendant custody of the 
children without determining that the move was in the 
children' s best interest and in the face of overwhelming 
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evidence that the move was not in the children' s best 
interest. 
Moreover, the trial court erred in awarding custody to 
the defendant although Kim Peterson, who recommended that 
custody remain with the defendant, admitted that he had not 
reviewed the most recent psychological reports or reviewed the 
recommendation of Dr. Liebroder and acknowledged that his 
opinion might be altered if he discovered that those reports 
recommended that plaintiff be awarded custody. 
POINT II 
The evidence indicated, and the trial court found, that 
the defendant knowingly and willfully violated a court order 
when she moved the children to Washington without permission 
from either the court or the plaintiff. Therefore the court 
erred in refusing to find the defendant in contempt. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING DEFENDANT TO 
MOVE THE PARTIES' CHILDREN FROM UTAH IN 
CONTRAVENTION TO THE STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES 
AND THE CHILDREN' S BEST INTEREST. 
The instant matter came before the court pursuant to 
plaintiff s Motion for Immediate Change of Custody and 
Determination of Contempt. It is important to note that the 
characterization of that motion was necessitated by the fact 
that the defendant had moved the children to Washington, in 
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defiance of the terms of the parties' divorce decree, without 
permission of the court or even notice to the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff did not contest the custody award, to which the 
parties had agreed, prior to the move. At the hearing 
initially set for plaintiff s motion, he expressed concern 
that the fact that the children had already been moved to 
Washington would weigh against him when the court heard 
defendant' s motion to permit her to make the move. Thus, the 
court held that the matter would be considered at trial as if 
the children were still living in Utah. As a result, at 
trial, the court was faced not only with the issues of 
custody and contempt, but with the issue of whether the 
defendant, as custodial parent, should be permitted to move 
with the children to Washington. 
The custody evaluations performed by Kim Peterson 
and Dr. Liebroder prior to the parties' divorce, emphasized 
that the children' s best interest would be served if the 
defendant, the custodial parent, remained in Utah so that the 
plaintiff could have easy access to the children. Their 
reports found that both parties were fit parents and that the 
children were bonded to both parents but the reports noted a 
slight preference for placement of custody with the defendant, 
principally because she was the primary caretaker. 
With those recommendations in mind, the parties 
entered into a stipulation regarding custody, which was 
incorporated into their divorce decree. In that stipulation, 
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plaintiff agreed that defendant would be granted custody of 
the children and defendant agreed to reside with the children 
within 50 miles of Salt Lake County. Defendant further agreed 
that she would not breach this agreement without a 
determination by the court, after follow-up evaluations "that 
such a move is in the best interest of the children. " (R. 
Ill) Note that the Stipulation does not require only that the 
defendant establish that it is in the best interest of the 
children that she retain custody before she can move the 
children out of Utah. It requires that she establish that the 
move is in their best interest. 
Both this Court and the Utah Supreme Court have made 
it clear that stipulations executed to settle disputes in 
domestic relations matters are not to be taken lightly. This 
position is amply illustrated in Despain v. Despain, 627 P. 2d 
526 (Utah 1981); 620 P. 2d 1303 (Utah 1980). In Despain. the 
parties entered into a Stipulation and Property Settlement 
which was incorporated into their divorce decree. The 
Stipulation provided, in relevant part, that the plaintiff, in 
return for cash settlement, waved all other claims against the 
defendant, 627 P. 2d at 1306, and that the defendant would 
provide support for the parties' children so long as they 
resided with the plaintiff and were full-time students. 627 
P. 2d at 526. Sometime later, the plaintiff in Despain 
determined that she had not adequately taken into account the 
value of a trust fund. Consequently, she moved the court for 
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an order granting her one-half of the trust res. The trial 
court granted the motion. In reversing the trial court, the 
Supreme Court noted that the plaintiff "totally ignored the 
terms of the property settlement agreement whereby she 
relinquished any and all claims to that part of the marital 
estate." 610 P. 2d at 1306. The ctourt held that the trial 
court erred, "for in the absence of compelling equitable 
considerations, the terms of tihe property settlement 
agreement are not to be abrogated. " 1^ . 
Not long after that ruling, the defendant in 
Despain decided that the settlement was no longer to his 
liking. Specifically, because the Law had changed from the 
time of the decree so that the court had power to award child 
support only until the child was 21 years old, the defendant 
argued that he should be relieved] from his obligation to 
support his children after they reached the age of 21. 627 
P. 2d at 527. The Supreme Court wafe not sympathetic, noting 
that: 
Equity is not available to reinstate 
rights and privileges, voluntarily 
contracted away simply because one has 
come to regret the bargain made. 
Accordingly, the law limits the 
continuing jurisdiction of the court 
where the property settlement 
agreement has been incorporated into 
the decree and the outright abrogation 
of the provisions of such Agreement is 
only to be resorted to with great 
reluctance and for compelling reasons. 
Id. at 527. The Court ruled that in matters involving child 
support the court retains powers of modification, even in the 
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face of a stipulation, but the court should exercise that 
power to abrogate a stipulation only where compelling 
circumstances necessitating the modification exist. I&. 
Similarly, in Kinsman v. Kinsman, 73 Utah Adv. Rep. 
110 (January 12, 1988), this Court held that a simple change 
of circumstances will not overcome a stipulated waiver of 
alimony incorporated into a divorce decree. The Kinsman Court 
reasoned that allowing a change of circumstances to overcome a 
stipulation "opens the door to abuse" as it would allow 
parties to negotiate settlements that hold up only so long as 
both parties considered the settlement beneficial, at which 
time they would be back in court arguing for modification 
based upon a change of circumstances. Lsl. at n. 2. 
Consequently, permitting a court to disregard a divorce 
stipulation without substantial justification, promotes the 
likelihood that the parties will litigate their disputes in 
the hope of establishing finality. 1^. 
In the instant case, the defendant agreed not to 
move from Utah absent a judicial determination that the move 
was in the best interest of the parties' children. In fact, 
in Utah, such a concession is nothing more than is required by 
law. In Ebbert v. Ebbert. 744 P. 2d 1019, 1023 (Utah App. 
1987), this Court held that, even absent a stipulation, 
failure of a court to find that a move is in the children' s 
best interest when awarding custody to a parent who has moved 
constitutes reversible error. See also Bloss v. Bloss, 711 
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P. 2d 663 (Ariz. App. 1985) (holding that the balance between 
the right of a parent to travel and the interest of the 
children tips in favor of the children; therefore, a custodial 
parent must establish that a move away from the non-custodial 
parent is in the children' s best interest before the move can 
be made) Thus, in the instant case, the court was bound by 
law, as well as by the parties' stipulation, to determine 
whether the move to Washington was in the children' s best 
interest before awarding custody to the defendant. 
The trial court herein failed to find that the move was 
in the children' s best interest. The court found only that 
it was in the best interest of the children to remain in the 
defendant's custody. See Addendum Exhibit "A" at Findings of 
Fact paragraph 13. In truth, virtually all of the evidence 
introduced at trial indicates that it is not in the best 
interest of the children to move from Utah. 
Dr. Liebroder recommended, not only that the move 
would not be in the best interest of the children, but that 
the psychological profile of the parties indicate that 
awarding custody to the plaintiff would be in the children' s 
best interest. The Doctor' s conclusion was based upon the 
fact that, as a result of therapy, plaintiff had gained in 
emotional stability, while defendant' s stability had 
degenerated. The Doctor' s conclusion was further supported by 
a finding that the defendant was not placing the best 
interests of her children above her own. 
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Kim Peterson noted that he saw placement with the 
mother as being "slightly more desirable, as this approach 
would seem less disruptive. " (Ex. 1-P) Mr. Peterson7 s report 
notes that "the ideal situation would be for [defendant] to 
continue to reside in Utah to allow [plaintiff] continued 
access to his children." (Ex. 1-P, p. 7) The report also 
notes that the move could benefit the children if it were the 
only way that defendant could be a full-time mother. (Ex. 1-
P at p. 7) However, at trial, Mr. Peterson testified that he 
had some doubt that defendant's husband could not obtain a job 
in Utah with wages similar to those earned in Washington. (Tr. 
142). 
In short, it appears that the court lost sight of a 
central issue in this case. The court made no finding that 
the move to Washington was in the best interest of the 
parties' children. Further, it ignored overwhelming evidence 
that the move was not in their best interest. By doing so, 
the court permitted the defendant to escape the restrictions 
of a stipulation which she entered into voluntarily. 
Unfortunately, the fact that defendant moved to 
Washington before it was determined that the move was in the 
children' s best interest adds a substantial complication to 
the issue now before the Court. Should defendant refuse to 
return to Utah, the issue, unavoidably, becomes one of 
custody. 
It is beyond dispute that the trial court has broad 
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discretion in resolving custody disputes. However, the 
evidence in this case indicates that the court abused its 
discretion in granting custody to the defendant. It is true 
that the two custody evaluators testifying before the court 
came to two different conclusions. Yet, Mr. Peterson, who 
recommended that custody remain with defendant, admitted that 
he relied upon plaintiff s conduct prior to divorce and 
psychological problems documented in the psychological report 
administered prior to that divorce. Mr. Peterson acknowledged 
that he had not reviewed the most recent psychological 
reports because he believed the court wished his 
recommendation to be independent of Dr. Liebroder' s. He also 
acknowledged that he often relied upon psychological reports 
and respected the work of Dr. Liebroder. In fact, Mr. Peterson 
admitted that he might change his mind about the custody issue 
if he discovered that Dr. Liebroder took a position contrary 
to his own. In is inconceivable that, in the face of those 
admissions, the court accepted Mr. Peterson' s recommendations 
and awarded the custody of the children to the defendant. 
Very simply, while plaintiff sympathizes with the 
court' s difficult position in determining where custody should 
be placed, plaintiff believes that the trial court erred in 
accepting the recommendation of a custody evaluator when the 
evaluator admitted that he had not taken into account all 
factors that he considered relevant before reaching his 
conclusion. Consequently, plaintiff herein requests that, 
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should defendant refuse to return to Utah with the children, 
and, again, forces the issue of custody, this Court should 
require that a new hearing on custody be conducted. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND 
THE DEFENDANT IN CONTEMPT IN THE 
FACE OF UNDISPUTED EVIDENCE THAT 
SHE KNOWINGLY AND WILLFULLY VIOLATED 
THE TERMS OF A COURT ORDER. 
It has been long established in this jurisdiction 
that the "duty to hold contempt in a civil matter in order to 
afford relief to another party does not lie within the 
discretion of the trial court, although the form of punishment 
necessary to insure compliance with orders is, and should be, 
within the sound discretion of the court. " Butler v. Butler, 
461 P. 2d 727, 729-30 (Utah 1969). Thus, where undisputed 
facts indicate that a party has failed or refused to "do or to 
refrain from doing an act ordered by the court for the benefit 
of the other party," the court must find the recalcitrant 
party in contempt. ££• 
In this case, the failure of the court to find the 
defendant in contempt defies reason. In its Findings of Fact, 
the court notes that "defendant removed herself and the minor 
children to the state of Washington without the court' s 
permission and in knowing violation of the order of this 
court. " See Addendum Exhibit "A" at Findings of Fact 
paragraph 4. That conclusion was unavoidable, as the evidence 
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on the point was uncontradicted. 
Moreover, no satisfactory explanation was offered 
for the defendant' s conduct. Defendant explained that she left 
because the hearing on her Motion for Permission to Leave the 
State of Utah was continued. However, that continuation was 
to allow completion of follow-up evaluations. As stated in 
the parties' divorce decree, defendant agreed that those 
evaluations would be performed before she moved. Further, 
there was evidence that defendant' p motivation was due at 
least in part to a belief that, if sl\e complied with the Order 
and left the children in Utah, she would be less likely to 
prevail on her Motion. She preferreq to saddle the Plaintiff 
with the possible disadvantage of having to argue his case in 
the face of the fact that the children had already moved and 
would have to be moved back if the court ruled in his favor. 
In short, the defendant sought to deny the plaintiff the 
protection to which she had agreed. In view of the court' s 
ruling, it may well be that she succeeded. While it is certain 
that the court made every attempt to consider the matter as if 
the move had not taken place, it is| not likely that either 
the court or Mr. Peterson could totally disregard the fact 
that if the plaintiff were granted cUstody the children would 
have to be moved from Washington. 
Further, this is not a case where defendant' s conduct was 
a slight breach, causing mere irritation to the plaintiff and 
the parties' children. Defendant's actions effectively 
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eliminated the plaintiff s rights of visitation including 
visitation to which he was entitled during the Christmas 
holidays. 
Moreover, the defendant made no attempt to mitigate the 
impact of her actions. She did not tell the plaintiff of her 
plans (and she may well have intentionally concealed the 
plans from the court appointed psychologist). Most 
egregiously, she did not allow the children a chance to say 
"good-bye" to their father. Even Kim Peterson, who 
recommended that the children be awarded to the mother, termed 
such conduct "unconscionable." 
In view of these undisputed facts, the court's 
decision to deny plaintiff s Motion for Contempt is both 
insupportable and unjust. As a result of the court's decision, 
the defendant is given the full benefit of her malfeasance. 
The plaintiff, on the other hand, is left with a reasonable 
question in his mind whether there is any real judicial 
protection of his parental rights. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing points and authorities, 
plaintiff herein requests that this Court: 
1. Order the defendant to return to Utah with the 
parties' minor children as it is not in their best interest to 
reside in Washington where they do not have easy access to 
their father; or 
2. If the defendant refuses to return to Utah, 
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plaintiff requests that this Court order a new hearing on 
custody; and 
3. Plaintiff requests that this Court reverse the 
trial court and find the defendant in contempt for leaving 
Utah with the parties' minor children without permission from 
the court and remand the matter to the trial court to 
determine an appropriate sanction. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2. *2- day of January, 
1988. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ J 
of and for 
COHNE, RAPPAPORT & SEGAL 
525 East 100 South, Suite 500 
Salt ^ake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 532-2666 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/ 
Appellant 
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I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true 
copy of the above and foregoing Appellant' s Brief, this J2J2L 
day of January, 1988, to: 
Mr. James 0. Has kins 
HASKINS & HANSON 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Attorneys for Defendant/Respondent. 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
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ADDENDUM 
EXHIBIT "A 
JAMES C. HASKINS (1406) 
HASKINS & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 268-3994 
FILED iN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Calt Lake Coimiv Utah 
j u i : ' j i - J O / 
i D>9mHw>6ley U*rk 3tcf^!isl/j£oL'ri 
Depuiv Cl^rk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
K. RUSSELL MYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAWNYA MYERS (LUKE) 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. D-85-1828 
Judge Michael R. Murphy 
* * * * * * * * 
The plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce and defendant's Petition to Leave the State of Utah came 
on for hearing on the 20th day of February, 1987, before the Hon-
orable Judge Michael R. Murphy, one of the judges of the 
above-entitled court. The plaintiff appeared in person and was 
represented by counsel, Davids. Dolowitz, and defendant appeared 
in person and was represented by counsel, James C. Haskins. The 
court heard testimony of the parties and the expert testimony of 
Dr. Barbara Liebroder and Mr. Kim Peterson and the argument of 
respective counsel, and the court being fully advised in the 
premises and having taken the matter under advisement, now makes 
and enters its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The Decree of Divorce was entered in this matter 
on the 9th day of June, 1986. 
2. There have been substantial changes in circum-
stances since entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, 
3. Pursuant to the Decree of Divorce, based on the 
stipulation of the parties, defendant was awarded custody of the 
parties* minor children provided that she remain in and reside 
within the jurisdiction of the court unless she obtain permission 
from the court to remove from the specified area. 
4. Defendant filed a Motion for Permission to Leave 
the State of Utah based on defendant's husband's employment, but 
when the hearing of said motion was continued, defendant removed 
herself and the minor children to the State of Washington without 
the court's permission and in knowing violation of the Order of 
this court. 
5. As a further changed circumstance, the plaintiff 
has undergone therapy in an effort to improve the emotional prob-
lems he was advised existed when the original custody evaluations 
were performed. 
6. Plaintiff has acted in the best interests of the 
children of the parties. 
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7. Defendant's stability has degenerated since the 
entry of the Decree of Divorce herein, a large part of which de-
generacy has been caused by post-divorce problems. 
8. Dr. Barbara Liebroder has conducted psychological 
and custodial evaluations on the partiesL their children, the 
husband of the defendant and the girlfriend of plaintiff, and 
concluded that it would be in the best interests of the parties1 
minor children for the plaintiff to be awarded the care, custody 
and control of said minor children even though the minor children 
are bonded to the defendant, the defendant has been the primary 
caretaker of said children and can spend more time with said 
children. 
9. Kim Peterson, MSW, LCSW, recommended that it would 
be in the best interests of the parties' minor children for the 
defendant to retain custody of the said minor children based upon 
the findings of the plaintiff's prior conduct and psychological 
problems contained in previous psychological reports, and based 
upon the plaintiff's being a full-time caretaker, having bonded 
with said children, and to avoid unnecessary trauma to the chil-
dren of a change of custodial parent. He jalso recommended that 
the first choice of action in the best interest of the children 
would be that they remain in Salt Lake City, Utah with the defen-
dant as their custodial parent. If that was not the order of the 
court, then it was slightly better that they remain in the 
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custody of the defendant and reside in Washington than if custody 
was transferred to plaintiff. 
10. The court finds that the parties1 minor child, 
Nathan, is hyperactive and is in need of therapy and that contin-
ued psychological reports of Nathan1s progress should be provided 
to the court and to the plaintiff. 
11. It is reasonable that the parties should equally 
divide the cost of therapy for the minor child, Nathan. 
12. The court find that both parents are fit and 
proper persons to be awarded custody of said minor children. 
13. The court finds that it is in the best interest of 
the parties' minor children to remain in the custody of the de-
fendant who is a full-time caretaker and who has bonded with said 
children, and that it would not be in the best interest of said 
children to change custody. 
14. The continued custody of defendant should be con-
ditioned upon defendant forthwith beginning psychological ther-
apy, and continuing such until an appropriate report and evalua-
tion is submitted to the court and plaintiff's counsel indicating 
no further therapy is required. 
15. All evaluations and reports including future and 
past psychological and custodial reports made part of the court 
file should be confidential and sealed and not made available to 
the public. 
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16. The court finds that the defendant, by her acts, 
has not encouraged a close father/child relationship between the 
plaintiff and the parties' minor children, and that both parties 
should be ordered to do all in their respective power to encour-
age a healthy and close relationship between the parties' minor 
children and the other party. 
17. The plaintiff should be awarded a specific minimum 
visitation schedule with the parties' minor children based upon 
said children residing out of the State of Utah, as follows: 
a. Monthly visitation of at least one weekend 
with reasonable prior notice, no less than two weeks before visi-
tation; 
b. Two (2) months during the summer, upon sixty 
(60) days prior notice; 
c. Christmas vacation commencing the day before 
Christmas Day and the day after Christmas Day on alternating 
years running until January 2 of each year; 
d. Alternate Thanksgiving or Easter holiday vis-
itation with plaintiff electing which holiday to commence with in 
1987; 
e. Holiday vacations should be upon prior notice 
of at least thirty (30) days; 
f. Prior notice of intent to exercise visitation 
should be made in writing; 
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g. The plaintiff should be entitled to free tel-
ephone access to the parties1 minor children. 
18. It is reasonable that the defendant should notify 
the plaintiff when the parties1 minor children are visiting with 
the children's grandparents in Salt Lake City, Utah so that 
plaintiff may visit with said children during such visits. 
19. It is reasonable that since defendant has moved 
with said minor children from Salt Lake County, State of Utah, 
that the plaintiff should pay one-third (1/3) and the defendant 
pay two-thirds (2/3) of the cost of transporting the minor chil-
dren to Salt Lake County, Utah for plaintiff to exercise visita-
tion. 
20. It is reasonable that each party should be ordered 
to keep the other party apprised at all times of his or her cur-
rent residence address and telephone number. 
21. The court finds that plaintiff is past due in the 
payment of his child support obligation for the months of Decem-
ber, 1986 and January and February, 1987. 
22. The defendant should be granted judgment against 
the plaintiff in the sum of $1,350.00 (retroactive from court 
date) for said past due support, provided that no execution 
should be issued on said judgment as long as the plaintiff makes 
his ordered child support payments each month plus $100.00 on the 
arrearage until it is paid in full. 
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23. It is reasonable that the plaintiff's child sup-
port obligation should be abated on a pro rata basis during the 
times when the minor children are visiting with the plaintiff for 
periods in excess of a weekend. 
24. It is reasonable that since plaintiff is a resi-
dent of Salt Lake County, State of Utah, that he above-entitled 
court should maintain jurisdiction over the parties1 minor chil-
dren. 
25. It is reasonable that any and all previous dis-
putes between the parties involving money matters, including but 
not limited to plaintiff's nonpayment of rent and attorney's fees 
as ordered by the court and defendant's interception of 
plaintiff's funds, should be washed and considered equal, with 
the exception of the above-described judgment for past due child 
support. 
26. Plaintiff's motion to hold defendant in contempt 
of court should be denied. 
27. The parties have agreed that because of the change 
in economic circumstances, to-wit: the remarriage of the defen-
dant, the child support paid to the defendant should be reduced 
to the sum of $225.00 per month per child, for a total of $450.00 
per month as child support, which shall be due and payable as set 
forth in the Decree of Divorce. 
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28. The parties agreed that defendant should be re-
quired to obtain health insurance on the minor children of par-
ties and maintain that insurance as part of the agreement setting 
child support at $450.00 per month on the children. 
29. Each party should be ordered to pay his or her own 
attorney's fees and court costs incurred in bringing this action. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the court now 
makes and enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The parties are subject to the jurisdiction of the 
court. 
2. The parties1 minor children shall remain in the 
custody of the defendant subject to plaintiff's right to visita-
tion. 
3. The continue custody of the children in the defen-
dant is conditioned upon defendant forthwith beginning psycholog-
ical therapy, and continuing such until an appropriate report and 
evaluation is submitted to the court and plaintiff's counsel jus-
tifies termination of this requirement. 
4. All evaluations and reports including future and 
past psychological and custodial reports made part of the court 
file are confidential and are to be sealed and not made available 
to the public, but shall be available to the court and counsel 
for each of the parties. 
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5. The parties' minor child, Nathan, shall be en-
rolled in therapy and continued psychological reports of Nathan's 
progress shall be provided to the court and to the plaintiff. 
6. The parties hereto shall equally divided the cost 
of therapy for the minor child, Nathan. 
7. Both parties are ordered to do all in their re-
spective power to encourage a healthy and close relationship be-
tween the parties' minor children and the other party. 
8. The plaintiff is awarded a specific minimum visi-
tation schedule with the parties1 minor children based upon said 
children residing out of the State of Utah, as follows: 
a* Monthly visitation of at least one weekend 
with reasonable prior notice of no less than two weeks before 
visitation. 
b. For two (2) months durfing the summer, upon 
sixty (60) days prior notice; 
c. Christmas visitation commencing the day be-
fore Christmas Day and the day after Christmas Day on alternating 
years running until January 2 of each year; 
d. Alternate Thanksgiving or Easter holiday vis-
itation with plaintiff electing which holiday to commence with in 
1987; 
e. Holiday vacations upon prior notice of at 
least thirty (30) days; 
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f. Plaintiff's prior notice of intent to exer-
cise visitation should be made in writing; 
g. Plaintiff is entitled to free telephone ac-
cess to the parties1 minor children. 
9. Defendant should notify the plaintiff when the 
parties1 minor children are visiting with the said minor 
children's grandparents in Salt Lake County, Utah so that plain-
tiff may visit with said children during such visits to Utah. 
10. Plaintiff should pay one-third (1/3) and the de-
fendant is to pay two-thirds (2/3) of the cost of transporting 
the minor children to Salt Lake County, Utah for plaintiff to ex-
ercise visitation. 
11. Plaintiff's child support obligation shall abate 
on a pro rata basis during visitation extending longer than 
weekends. 
12. Each party should be ordered to keep the other 
party apprised at all times of his or her current residence ad-
dress and telephone number. 
13. The defendant should be granted judgment against 
the plaintiff in the sum of $T,800.08 pastydue support for the 
months of December, 1986 and January and February, 1987; pro-
vided, however, that execution on said judgment should be stayed 
so long as the plaintiff pays $100.00 per month on this arrearage 
and is current in his ongoing child support obligation. 
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14. The child support obligation of the plaintiff to 
the defendant should be reduced to the sum of $225.00 per month 
per child, for a total of $450.00 per month as child support, the 
same to be due and payable as set forth m the Decree of Divorce. 
15. The plaintiff should maintain health and accident 
insurance on the minor children of the parties for so long as he 
is paying child support on their behalf and if he may do so for a 
longer period of time under the terms and conditions on the 
health insurance policy obtained, he should do so. 
16. The above-entitled court shall maintain jurisdic-
tion over the parties1 minor children. 
17. Any and all previous disputes between the parties 
involving money matters, including but not limited to plaintiff's 
non-payment of rent and attorneyfs fees as ordered by the court 
and defendant's interception of plaintiff's funds, are washed 
equal, and are hereby deemed satisfied with the exception of the 
above-described judgment for past due child support. 
18. Plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant in con-
tempt of court is denied. 
19. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own 
attorney's fees and court costs incurred in bringing this action. 
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DATED this ^ >'' day of , ., 1987 
BY THE COURT: 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form and content 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
ATTEST 
J /fy//tJ 
D»futy Oicric 
2012:032387D 
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JAMES C. HASKINS (1406) 
HASKINS & HANSON 
Attorneys for Defendant 
5085 South State Street 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 268-3994 
FILED IN CLERK'S OFFICE 
Salt Lake Counly Utah 
JUL 2 0 1987 
'•> I H Dixon Hwdley/Ctefk&dTJist^ourt 
Oy 
jixonHWKiiey/oieiiwi 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * * 
K. RUSSELL MYERS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TAWNYA MYERS (LUKE) 
Defendant. 
ORDER 
Civil No. D-85-1828 
Judjge Michael R. Murphy 
* * * * * * * * 
The plaintiff's Petition for Modification of Decree of 
Divorce and defendant's Petition to Leave the State of Utah came 
on for hearing on the 20th day of February, 1987, before the Hon-
orable Judge Michael R. Murphy, one of the judges of the 
above-entitled court. The plaintiff appealed in person and was 
represented by counsel, David S. Dolowitz, and defendant appeared 
in person and was represented by counsel, James C. Haskins. The 
court heard testimony of the parties and the expert testimony of 
Dr. Barbara Liebroder and Mr, Kim Peterson and the argument of 
respective counsel, and the court being fully advised in the 
premises and having previously entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, now therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
1. The parties1 minor children shall remain in the 
custody of the defendant, subject to plaintiff's right to visita-
tion at minimum as outlined hereinafter. 
2. The continued custody of the minor children in the 
defendant is conditioned upon defendant forthwith beginning psy-
chological therapy, and continuing such until an appropriate re-
port and evaluation is submitted to the court and plaintiff's 
counsel which would justify termination of this requirement. 
3. All evaluations and reports including future and 
past psychological and custodial reports made part of the court 
file are confidential and are to be sealed and not made available 
to the public, but shall be available to the court and counsel 
for each of the parties. 
4. The parties' minor child, Nathan, shall be en-
rolled in therapy and continued psychological reports of Nathan's 
progress shall be provided to the court and to the plaintiff. 
5. The parties hereto shall equally divided the cost 
of therapy for the minor child, Nathan. 
6. Both parties are ordered to do all in their re-
spective power to encourage a healthy and close relationship be-
tween the parties' minor children and the other party. 
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7. The plaintiff is awarded a specific minimum visi-
tation schedule with the parties' minor children based upon said 
children residing out of the State of Utah, as follows: 
a. Monthly visitation of at least one weekend 
with reasonable prior notice of no less than two weeks before 
visitation. 
b. For two (2) months during the summer, upon 
sixty (60) days prior notice; 
c. Christmas visitation commencing the day be-
fore Christmas Day and the day after Christmas Day on alternating 
years and continue thereafter until January 2 of each year; 
d. Alternate Thanksgiving or Easter holiday vis-
itation with plaintiff electing which holiday commencing in 1987; 
e. Holiday vacations upon prior notice of at 
least thirty (30) days; 
f. Plaintiff's prior notice of intent to exer-
cise visitation shall be made in writing; 
g. Plaintiff is entitled to free telephone ac-
cess to the parties' minor children, 
8, Defendant is to notify the plaintiff when the par-
ties1 minor children are visiting with the said minor children's 
grandparents in Salt Lake County, Utah so that plaintiff may 
visit with said children during such visits to Utah, 
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9. Plaintiff is to pay one-third (1/3) and the defen-
dant is to pay two-thirds (2/3) of the cost of transporting the 
minor children to Salt Lake County, Utah for plaintiff to exer-
cise visitation. 
10. Plaintiff's child support obligation shall abate 
on a pro rata basis during visitation extending longer than 
weekends. 
11. Each party is ordered to keep the other party ap-
prised at all times of his or her current residence address and 
telephone number. 
12. The defendant is granted judgment against the 
plaintiff in the sum of $1,350.00 (retroactive from court date) 
past due support for the months of December, 1986 and January and 
February, 1987; provided that execution on said judgment is 
stayed as long as the plaintiff makes payments of $100.00 per 
month on the arrearage and is current in his ongoing child sup-
port. 
13. The child support that the plaintiff is to pay to 
the defendant for the care and maintenance of the minor children 
of the parties is reduced to the sum of $225.00 per month per 
child, for a total of $450.00 per month to be due and payable as 
set forth in the Decree of Divorce. 
-4-
14. The defendant shall obtain and maintain health and 
accident insurance for the minor children of the parties as 
agreed upon by plaintiff in turn for the $450.00 child support. 
15. The above-entitled court shall maintain jurisdic-
tion over the parties' minor children. 
16. Any and all previous disputes between the parties 
involving money matters, including but not limited to plaintiff's 
non-payment of rent and attorney's fees as ordered by the court 
and defendant's interception of plaintiff's funds, are washed, 
considered equal, and resolved with the exception of the 
above-described judgment for past due child support. 
17. Plaintiff's motion to hold the defendant in con-
tempt of court is denied. 
18. Each party is ordered to pay his or her own 
attorney's fees and court costs incurred in bringing this action. 
DATED this *J o day of .joX^ 1987. 
BY THE COURT 
h- -
// / u / J i fC
 j flu 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Approved as to form and content: 
DAVID S. DOLOWITZ c7~ ^ 'JJ^jh^L^^\v ''"•' 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2012:032387E 
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